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Abstract 
During their time in office, British governments’ styles of political judgement or bias 
in policymaking often become shorter in term and less intellectually coherent, 
sometimes in passive or coping ways, sometimes shifting toward imposition. This 
article offers an explanation, developing the neo-Durkheimian theory of institutional 
dynamics. Changing judgement style, it argues, is driven by changes in administrations’ 
informal institutional ordering of social organisation. ‘Isolation dynamics’ are shifts in 
that ordering towards weakly cohesive but strongly constrained, ‘isolate’ forms. 
Increased isolate ordering is reflected in less cohesive but more constrained judgement 
style. Novel distinctions within isolate ordering explain key differences among 
administrations’ trajectories. Using extensive archival data, three British 
administrations between 1959 and 1974 are compared. The study finds that, among 
otherwise contrasting administrations, reinforcement or undermining in informal 
social organisation drove changes in styles of political judgement, as shown in their 
ways of framing policy problems, risks, time horizons etc.
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During their time in office, British governments’ styles of political judgement or bias 
in policymaking often become shorter in term and less intellectually coherent, 
sometimes in passive or coping ways, sometimes shifting toward imposition.1 The 
phenomenon has not been satisfactorily understood. Administrations of different 
parties, ideologies and personalities and experiencing different setbacks develop in this 
direction from very different starting points. Therefore neither constant features of 
parties or individuals nor transient empirical events suffice to explain the convergence. 
 This article argues that the neo-Durkheimian theory of institutional dynamics 
(Thompson, 1992; 6, 2003) can help to explain it. Originating in anthropology 
(Douglas, 1982, 1986), the approach has attracted growing interest across the policy 
sciences (Hood, 1998; Thompson et al, 1990; Wildavsky, 1998; Coyle and Ellis, 1994; 
Lodge et al, 2010; 6, 2011, 2014ab, forthcoming; special issue of PS, 2011). The theory 
argues that judgement styles are cognitively only as integrated or regulated as 
policymakers are socially integrated and regulated. Thus, changing informal social 
organisation among ministers and their most senior advisers, toward the form 
introduced below, explains the trajectory. It expects this kind of social organisation to 
be associated with particular stylistic features of decisionmaking, irrespective of 
ideology. This relationship should arise to any policy field affected. To examine this, 
to develop the theory and to show its range, plausibility and interest (without aspiring 
to test it), the study compares policy judgement styles using case studies showing 
contrasting pathways toward this condition in three British administrations of different 
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parties and initial informal organisation and across contrasting policy fields. The 
conclusion identifies implications for understanding policymaking dynamics. 
 As with studies of any well-documented period, the aim is not to predict previously 
unknown particular facts and then reveal new empirical sources to examine those 
retrodictions. Rather, if the theory’s expectations are supported, the study’s 
contribution lies in providing an integrated, comprehensive and parsimonious 
explanation for variations and overarching patterns among known empirical factors. 
Resolving important conceptual ones such as this one can sustain scientific progress 
as much as solving empirical problems (Laudan, 1977). 
Neo-Durkheimian institutional dynamics 
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory argues that forms of social organisation and 
their conflicts cultivate particular thought styles (Douglas, 1986) and biases in 
judgement and decisionmaking (6, 2011, 2014a). Decision-makers paint their social 
organisation onto the faces of their problems, opportunities, opponents, etc. In 
transposed form, judgement styles replicate relations ordered by people’s informal 
institutions (Durkheim and Mauss, 1963 [1902-3], 11).1 
 The most basic institutional forms of social organisation are, the theory argues, 
not indefinitely various. Durkheim’s (1951 [1897]; 1961 [1925]) two fundamental 
dimensions capture that variety – namely, social integration, or the degree to which 
practices, positions and relations are strongly or weakly accountable to bonds and 
membership; and social regulation, or strong or weak accountability to constraint, 
imperative, prescription, role and given fact. Cross-tabulating them (Douglas 1970, 
1982)2 generates four elementary forms, in Durkheim’s felicitous term (Fields, 1995, 
lx), which conflict or settle in differently weighted combinations (Hood, 1998; 
Thompson and Rayner, 1998; Thompson, Rayner and Ney, 1998):3 
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- hierarchical (H: strong regulation and integration): access to resources is rule-
bound; roles are clearly distinguished; membership boundaries are clear; 
decisions are made under known authorisation rules: power varies with status; 
- individualistic (Ind: weak regulation and integration): people find their own 
ways of accessing resources and brokering agreements: roles are fluid; status 
varies with personal power; 
- enclaved (E: strong integration, weak external regulation – i.e., only enough 
internally generated regulation to sustain strong integration without external 
authority: Rayner, 1988):4 collective action is sustained by shared commitment 
to values or principles: boundaries between with non-members are heavily 
marked to sustain commitment and collective power and status; shared 
resources and roles; and 
- isolate (Isl: strong external regulation, weak integration): without status, role, 
incentive or shared principle, collective action is difficult; access to resources 
and power is by force, fraud, guileful temporary evasion of particular 
constraints, or coping. 
 Most empirical settings exhibit all four in differently weighted mixes, in conflict, 
settlements or hybrids. Often, one form or a settlement between two is pre-eminent, 
or forms play different roles in different parts of an administration.  
 ‘Hierarchy’ is neither command nor domination nor just any inequality. It 
describes common membership in a community with unequal status roles and rule-
bound authorisation for action (Dumont, 1980). 
 In isolate ordering, where strong social regulation is not tempered by strong social 
integration, domination can arise. Here, social regulation may or may not be 
concentrated around weakly bonded but strongly constrained individuals struggling to 
hold on to positions of high office only by passing on constraints to others by 
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imposition. This position is ‘structurally despotic’ (Coyle, 1994). Those who cannot 
pass on or impose constraints but must accept, cope with or try to evade the resulting 
losses, are in ‘structural serf’ positions (6, 2011, 2014ab). Unable to use authority, 
incentive or community, both structural despots and structural serfs avoid loss 
acceptance from strong constraint only by guile, evasion, coping or withdrawal. 
 In administrations in democratic states, isolate ordering is more common than 
commonly imagined. It should not be confused with individual premiers being ‘lonely 
at the top’, but describes an institutional condition of weak social integration and 
strong constraint in all or part of an administration. 
 Such formal institutions as cabinet collective responsibility, prime ministerial pre-
eminence, ministerial accountability to the legislature or a permanent secretary’s 
accounting officer role may appear initially to engender hierarchy. But, without 
congruent informal institutions, they do not determine judgement style. It has long 
been recognised that formal institutions afford great variety in informal social 
institutions governing relations, within which people’s styles of thought are socialised, 
cultivated and decultivated. 
 The theory’s explanandum is thought style (Douglas 1986; Fleck, 1979; cf. Hacking, 
2002) or the manner by which beliefs are held (dogmatically or provisionally), emotions 
felt (ferociously, accommodatingly, and so on), classifications employed (rigidly, or 
allowing for blurring), risks and losses regarded (acceptable or unacceptable); 
anomalies handled, past and future time horizons weighted, fall-back options 
structured, and so on. In government, thought style reveals itself in patterns of political 
judgement and decisionmaking bias (6, 2011). 
 Thought style is not ideology and matters independently of it in political 
decisionmaking. Diametrically opposed ideologues may exhibit similar thought styles: 
strongly integrated, weakly regulated sectarian monetarists exhibit rigidity in style 
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resembling that of left-leaning sectarians. Conversely, ideological allies may think in 
different styles, for example with respect to willingness to trade short-term 
compromises for longer term gains, or bear particular kinds of political risk: 
individualistically ordered social democrats will show contrasting styles from enclaved 
factions (6, 2011, 2014ab, forthcoming). 
 Thus, the theory argues that judgement styles exhibit cognitive relations as tightly or 
as loosely integrated and regulated among categories, as informal institutions among 
policymakers are socially strongly or weakly integrated and regulated (Durkheim and 
Mauss, 1963, 11). In decisionmaking, tight or loose cognitive organisation is exhibited 
in relations among kinds of reasoning used, preferences and issue linkages established, 
and degrees of continuity in these things over time.  
 Examining the theory empirically therefore requires measuring informal 
institutions of social organisation and thought style (and changes in these things) 
separately, using structural and cognitive categories respectively. 
 Some categories coding stylistic features of bias and framing in decisions (6, 2011; 
2004) are generic (e.g., Thompson, 1992, 199-202); others have been developed 
specifically for studying political judgement (6, 2011). Table One presents codes used. 
[Table One] 
 For present purposes, empirical analysis focuses only on codes identified above 
for isolate ordering. 
 That the table shows isolate thought style exhibiting both rigidity and opportunism 
is not paradoxical. The rigidity distinctive of structural despotism is explained by fear 
of loss of fragile authority. When despotic attempts to impose solutions are frustrated, 
‘U-turns’ and opportunistic coping are the only available fall-back options (6, 2011). 
By contrast, other informal institutional orderings allow preparation of richer sets of 
fallback positions, between these extremes. Hierarchically ordered administrations 
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might respond with rule-based adjustment, and individualistically ordered ones with 
instrumental exploitation and negotiation. As administrations move deeper into isolate 
ordering, their judgement is expected to exhibit either increasing rigidity or 
opportunism or alternation between them. 
 The theory’s explanation of change rests on feedback dynamics in and between 
elementary forms (Thompson et al, 1990; Thompson, 1992; 6, 2003; 6 et al, 2006, 70). 
By the same mechanism through which institutions cultivate thought style, over time 
each form tends toward positive feedback, amplifying its style of organising, until 
checked by negative feedback from other (Douglas, 1986). ‘Isolation dynamics’ are 
positive feedback processes in which isolate ordering become stronger, although 
weaker elements of hierarchy, individualism or enclaving continue to be articulated. 
These dynamics may arise by positive reinforcement of incipient isolate institution or 
by negative feedback against or withdrawal from institutions of other forms. 
 Although understanding isolate ordering’s significance is a distinctive contribution 
of the theory, positive feedback in isolate ordering has not been studied in 
government. Yet transitions into deepening isolate ordering appear to be relatively 
common among British administrations, particularly in their later years, 
notwithstanding continuing contributions to maintaining background hierarchical 
ordering from constitutional accountabilities, defined roles of civil servants, statute 
law and so on. 
 Positive feedback loops have two phases (6, 2014a). First, informal institutions 
cultivate distinct thought or judgement styles (Douglas, 1986; Durkheim and Mauss, 
1963). Second, thought styles lead people to act in ways that buttress, reinforce and 
exaggerate that prevailing informal ordering. Beyond a certain point, however, self-
reinforcement produces anomalies (Douglas, 1966; 6, 2013, 2014b), adversities, 
setbacks, or weaknesses, so that it begins to disorganise itself (Durkheim, 1951, 1984). 
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Amplification provokes counter-reaction in other forms, as people respond with 
institutionally biased rejection, disappointment, anger or simply exhaustion 
(Thompson et al, 1990). However, where elementary forms depend on each other for 
institutional resources, negative feedback can also lead to accommodations or 
settlements (Hood, 1996; 6, 2003, 2014ab; Thompson et al, 1990). 
Institutional dynamics in British administrations 
This study’s unit of analysis of social organisation and of exercising political judgement 
is the ‘administration’, meaning senior ministers, their political advisers and senior civil 
servants working most closely with them under a given premier. This unit resembles 
the ‘core executive’ concept (Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995) more than that of the 
cabinet (or secretaries of state only). However, the core executive concept emphasises 
formal institutions of the prime minister’s office, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury 
and their administrative centrality rather than informal relations, which matter most 
here. This unit is appropriate because in British government, senior ministers 
appointed by the prime minister and their advisers form a field of social relations with 
social and reference primacy (cf. Merton, 1968) for its members: strength or weakness 
of bonds and authority here is critical in specifying the collective (in)capabilities 
sustaining policymaking. Yet, as the empirical sections below show, senior Treasury 
staff and even junior Cabinet Office staff are not always part of that primary unit of 
social reference. Units of observation are relations among ministers and advisers in 
each period on the explanans, mainly reconstructed from biographical and historical 
sources, and decisions on the explanandum, mainly reconstructed from primary sources. 
Documents are used as evidence for coding, not as units (Annex). 
 Expectations listed above are explored by comparing two policy fields in Harold 
Macmillan’s, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath’s administrations between the 1959 
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and February 1974 parliamentary elections, when they entered, or moved more deeply 
into isolate ordering (6, forthcoming). The administrations are selected not only for 
their difference in parties. More importantly, they exhibit diversity sufficient for a 
‘most different design’ on the ‘independent variables’ of forms of initial informal social 
organisation. The analysis below demonstrates that Macmillan’s administration began 
in predominantly hierarchical ordering in domestic affairs with a significant difference 
in the organisation of foreign policy; individualistic ordering prevailed in Wilson’s 
1960s administrations; isolate ordering was already significant in opposition in Heath’s 
shadow cabinet and his efforts to develop hierarchy had emphasised social regulation 
at the expense of social integration. 
 Two policy fields have been chosen to explore the range of the theory’s 
application.5 Analysis examines whether expected judgement styles are found in a 
foreign policy (Britain’s relations with the USA over the Vietnam war) and micro-
economic policy field (industrial relations and trade union law reform), in fields passing 
in and out of ‘high politics’, in routine and in crisis situations. The study is therefore 
structured by a matrix of six cases – three administrations by two policy fields. If codes 
on informal social organisation and judgement style are consistent across such 
different administrations and policy fields, this provides initial support for the theory. 
 Three pathways into isolation dynamics are examined. First, initially strongly 
hierarchical administrations may undergo self-reinforcement in pursuit of greater 
control, but instead generate negative reactions undermining social integration: thus 
seeking deeper hierarchy can result in isolate ordering. Secondly, administrations 
beginning with strongly individualistic ordering may accumulate adversities that erode 
capacities for negotiation and for patron-client ‘claque’ relationships (individual 
supporters each following a leader in expectation of personal benefit, as in ancient 
Roman patronage, by contrast with enclaved ‘cliques’, isolate clusters and hierarchical 
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rule-based central communities). Thirdly, administrations beginning with low levels of 
isolate ordering can positively reinforce it. The analysis below shows that Macmillan’s 
administration entered isolate ordering through the first path: aspirations to reinforce 
hierarchy by positive feedback were subverted by weak social integration. Heath’s 
administration combined the first and third paths. Isolate ordering was already 
significant in opposition and reinforced in office. Moreover, a structurally despotic 
order emerged, which made the dynamic deeper than in Macmillan’s administration. 
From a predominantly individualistic ordering, Wilson’s administration’s isolation 
dynamic took the second path in response to adversities, including unexpected policy 
outcomes. But that dynamic was short and shallow: the administration returned to 
individualistic ordering when its opponents faced their own adversities. 
 We first examine changing informal social organisation in the three 
administrations. 
Macmillan’s administration 
The isolate despotic informal ordering of Anthony Eden’s Conservative 
administration dissolved in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis and the ensuing 
individualistically ordered contest for the party leadership. Hierarchy was re-
established in domestic policy after Macmillan became prime minister in 1957. Neither 
RA Butler, Macmillan’s unsuccessful rival, nor any minister other than Macmillan 
sustained a strong personal claque. However, foreign affairs were ordered differently. 
Macmillan could use the hierarchically specified prime ministerial authority to reserve 
a zone of individualistic organisation in cold war and other foreign policy, where he 
had special interests and in which he wanted to appoint clients whom he could trust 
with discretion. This zone remained in place throughout the administration’s time in 
office and was indirectly important to the subsequent isolation dynamic. Macmillan 
reserved himself a key role in bilateral relations with the US president. He allowed his 
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personal client, Lord Home, promoted to be Foreign Secretary from July 1960, a zone 
of individualistic discretion outside superpower relations. Edward Heath was also 
allowed scope for individualistic leadership of his own team dealing with Britain’s 
application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). By 
contrast, Macmillan’s control over domestic affairs was more strongly based on 
executive authority and clear norms but with less personal control for non-client 
ministers. 
 After the Chancellor of the Exchequer and two of his ministerial team resigned 
dramatically in 1958, the only significant enclave was not in the administration but on 
the backbenches around the Tory grandee, Lord Salisbury, supporting white British 
colonists in Rhodesia and Kenya. Strong hierarchical ordering among ministers was 
exhibited in Butler’s subaltern role, in limited ministerial competition and in strong 
marking of role responsibilities. The few inter-ministerial conflicts of this period were 
driven by departmental conflicts rather by individual interests or power struggles. This 
hierarchical and individualistic ordering had affinities with – and reinforced the 
government’s hierarchical framing of – the ordering of the western alliance, in which 
Britain was a subaltern but held an honoured and significant position, reinforced by 
individualistically ordered personal relations between prime minister and president. 
That honoured second position was repaired after the Suez debâcle but became 
increasingly difficult financially to sustain. 
 By 1960-1, the administration’s informal organisation began to shift, although the 
individualistic structure remained intact in foreign relations. Macmillan’s attempt to 
modernise the British economy and government – notably through the creation of the 
National Economic Development Council to promote social integration of the policy 
process, the introduction of a more rule-based incomes policy and a more strategic 
governance of the nationalised industries – expressed a will for hierarchy. It required 
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internal changes within government to regulate and integrate relations between 
Number 10, Treasury, Ministry of Labour and regional development bodies. But 
Macmillan became impatient with the pace at which social regulation in government 
grew, and began to operate in ways that undermined social integration, leading 
unintendedly to an isolation dynamic (6, 2015b). In domestic affairs, Macmillan 
became increasingly interfering and occasionally coercive during 1961, especially 
toward the Treasury, although his worsening health limited its impact. He lost faith in 
Selwyn Lloyd at the Exchequer. He planned a reshuffle, yet dithered for weeks over 
its scope. In July 1962, Butler, whose loyalty had weakened, was indiscreet with a 
journalist about likely ministerial moves, causing Macmillan to panic. He undertook 
the most drastic reshuffle in decades, dubbed ‘the night of the long knives’. Seven 
senior ministers were sacked, including several longstanding friends. But this 
weakened Macmillan further, because he could not thereafter afford to lose any other 
leading minister. Trust between him and his colleagues plummeted. When his health 
permitted, Macmillan increasingly substituted sporadic micro-interference for 
collegiality. His insistence on pursuing EEC membership undermined ministerial 
cohesion, and the French President’s eventual veto weakened his internal authority 
still further. In 1962 and 1963, a series of high profile scandals further eroded the 
administration’s authority. During the Profumo affair, Macmillan was slow to sack his 
war minister who was subsequently found to have lied to Parliament about an extra-
marital affair which initially appeared to compromise national security. By mid-1963, 
Macmillan relied on formal power to retain his office rather than on accepted authority 
or collegial solidarity integrated into his cabinet’s less cohesive informal ordering. Yet 
he lacked a structural despot’s dominance. Individualism remained significant in the 
institutionally buffered field of foreign affairs: even after 1961/2, Home, Heath, and 
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then Butler (Howard, 1987, 288-294), were all allowed zones of considerable discretion 
while Macmillan concentrated on superpower diplomacy. 
Wilson’s administration 
Informal institutional ordering in Wilson’s 1960s administrations was characterised by 
individualistic rivalries among leading minsters and their claques (contra Bale 1999, 
enclaving developed on the backbenches, not in the administration). Rivalry between 
Economic First Secretary, George Brown, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, James 
Callaghan, dominated the first three years. As Callaghan’s and Brown’s stock fell that 
of the new Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, rose. Wilson preserved his position as the most 
powerful patron, playing off these ‘crown princes’, breaking up their claques, 
promoting his personal clients (especially Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle) and 
shunting other ministers into peripheral zones of isolate ordering. 
 After substantially increasing its majority in the 1966 election, adversities beset the 
administration. To Labour supporters, Wilson appeared to resort to McCarthyite anti-
communism to demand a settlement to the 1966 seamen’s strike, ‘Dissociation’ from 
US President Johnson’s bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in Vietnam offended both 
Washington and Labour’s anti-war backbenchers. In November 1967, French 
President De Gaulle again vetoed Britain’s EEC membership application, damaging 
Wilson and Brown, now Foreign Secretary. In the same month, the policy adopted in 
1964 of sacrificing expansion to preserve the dollar exchange rate finally became 
unsustainable, but devaluation undermined the administration’s economic credibility 
and Callaghan’s personal standing. A badly misjudged television broadcast by Wilson 
compounded the damage. 
 These setbacks for the principal patrons occasioned significant shifts in the 
cabinet’s informal organisation. Moving into an isolation dynamic was a response to 
adversity. Individualism was exhausted, as Ministers’ trust in Wilson and each other 
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fell. Callaghan’s claque was weakened by his post-devaluation move to the Foreign 
Office. Brown’s erratic behaviour likewise undermined his own support. The new 
informal organisation was clearly shown in December 1966 when, in the nearest the 
isolation dynamic came to a moment of despotic ordering, Wilson rode roughshod 
over his colleagues on the sensitive question of selling arms to South Africa, neither 
negotiating nor seeking to convince them. By January 1968, after many long cabinet 
meetings about severe budget cuts, ministers accepted that they had no option but to 
pass on and accept economic constraints by imposition. Bitter backbench protest 
against the cuts, especially against restoring prescription charges (Bale, 1999), put great 
pressure on left-leaning ministers, further dividing them from both their ministerial 
colleagues and their backbench supporters. Yet trust among senior ministers was so 
low that there was no revolt against Wilson; each feared that any move would create 
opportunities for rivals. In Moscow in February, Wilson went through the motions of 
negotiations for a ceasefire in Vietnam, but seemed to trust Washington little more 
than Moscow or his own Foreign Office. For weeks after his bruising January budget, 
Jenkins could do little to build alliances with colleagues; Brown had become semi-
detached from the administration; unlike the period from October 1964 until 
November 1967, other ministers now largely kept to their own briefs. 
 The isolation dynamic in Wilson administration resembled that of Macmillan’s, in 
the important role played by adversity and external constraint. But enough 
individualistic organisation remained in the cabinet to enable isolate ordering to be 
dissipated during March and April 1968. Wilson’s enemies overreached themselves. 
An inflammatory speech on race relations by a senior member of the shadow cabinet, 
Enoch Powell, plunged the Conservative opposition into greater difficulties even than 
the administration’s own. Brown resigned during a financial crisis in March, thus giving 
Wilson an opportunity to reshuffle. He promoted Barbara Castle, turning her into a 
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major figure but one dependent on his patronage, and placed a loyalist, Michael 
Stewart, in the Foreign Office. But reconstructing individualistic ordering was a 
collective process, not Wilson’s work alone. Jenkins began lunching his colleagues 
individually to negotiate support, reaching across the right-left chasm to secure Castle’s 
trust. Callaghan quietly used his role as Labour Party Treasurer to build personal 
support among trades unions. This individualistic ordering survived until the election, 
although there were isolates on the periphery after 1968-9 such as Edward Short and, 
by then, Anthony Crosland. Not even the infamous failure of Castle’s proposals for 
trade union reform in 1969 returned the core of the administration to isolate loss of 
cohesion, depressed competition or listless decisionmaking of early 1968. 
Heath’s administration 
As opposition leader from 1966, Edward Heath intended to cultivate hierarchical 
practice in his shadow administration, creating a baroque structure of policy 
committees. But informal isolate ordering was highly significant. Heath dominated his 
colleagues, neither developing a personal claque nor negotiating alliances. His senior 
colleagues, Reginald Maudling and Iain Macleod could neither integrate the shadow 
cabinet nor maintain the personal claques they had built in 1965. Maudling responded 
with increasing withdrawal, Macleod by concentrating on short-term parliamentary 
tactics. The 1966 election manifesto was little more than a fragmented list of 
committee proposals without an overarching theme – a problem avoided in the 1970 
election only by eschewing detail. 
 Heath intended similarly to introduce greater hierarchy into government on 
coming to power in 1970. He created the Central Policy Review Staff to undertake 
long-term strategic analysis, set up a formal system (Programme Analysis and Review) 
for budgetary control; overhauled cabinet committee machinery and ordered regular 
cabinet retreats for policy reviews. Like Macmillan, he sou
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to economic governance. Pursuing greater social regulation in these ways actually 
undermined social integration, reinforcing the pre-existing isolate ordering. Unlike 
Macmillan, by 1970 Heath occupied a structural despotic position. Adversities and 
setbacks encountered in 1971-2 pitched the hybrid hierarchical-isolate ordering of his 
administration into a deeper isolation dynamic than Macmillan’s administration 
endured in 1962-3. 
 A humiliating setback to the administration’s incomes policy caused by a national 
mineworkers’ strike in February 1972 occasioned alarm, despair but little collective 
action among both ministers and senior civil servants. Heath’s reaction was to grow 
increasingly domineering. More and more, he took policymaking into Number 10, 
especially on economic and industrial matters, delegating even less than previously. 
Withdrawing from engagement with political colleagues, he worked mainly with his 
own staff and a few senior civil servants. He personally controlled the EEC application 
process, seeking little advice beyond his own office. He insisted on ‘U-turns’ in both 
industrial policy and prices and incomes policy. 
 Heath hardly cultivated backbenches and appeared haughty when reluctantly 
appearing in the tearooms. Macleod’s death deprived the administration of one of the 
few ministers with enough political support to stand up to Heath. Maudling’s 
resignation following a corruption scandal in 1972, together with Foreign Secretary, 
Douglas-Home’s withdrawal from domestic policy discussion compounded the 
isolation dynamic. Even Heath’s relations with loyal ministers were distant, and quite 
unlike the instrumental offer to trade loyalty for advancement that Wilson offered his 
clients. After Maudling’s departure, Heath alone had effective power to range across 
departmental boundaries: ministers were kept firmly to their own briefs. Several, such 
as Education Secretary Margaret Thatcher simply fought departmental battles for 
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money, bringing few policy decisions to cabinet. In cabinet committees, deference to 
the minister with lead responsibility was common. 
 Some individualistic ordering was found, however, in the CPRS, before Heath 
clipped its director’s wings, and in Belfast after 1972, where Northern Ireland Secretary 
William Whitelaw had plenipotentiary negotiation powers, and exercised considerable 
personal patronage over his staff and junior ministers. But when Whitelaw returned to 
London in late 1973, he was shocked to find an almost dictatorial ordering around 
Number 10 (Ziegler, 2010, 417; Garnett and Aitken, 2002, 164-185). In his 
administration’s final months, an exhausted Heath struggled to take strategic decisions 
as cabinet cohesion disintegrated. Ministers engaged in disputes about the best date 
for an election, but neither enclaves nor claques around individual ministers emerged. 
Political judgement 
We now examine styles of political judgement in these administrations. The next two 
sections show that, as the theory predicts, they were as weakly integrated and strong 
regulated in the two policy fields as was each administration itself. The effects of 
changing social organisation were felt in areas far from those in which setbacks and 
adversities arose. Codes for aspects of isolate judgement style appear in brackets. For 
reasons of space, analysis concentrates on isolation dynamics periods. 
Relations with the US over Vietnam 
After the Suez fiasco, Macmillan and his foreign secretaries laboured to restore 
Britain’s position as a loyal subaltern in the hierarchically-ordered western alliance, 
while gently probing their position’s boundaries for independent diplomacy. Vietnam 
ranked low in political salience until 1963, even amongst Home’s east Asian priorities, 
and the Foreign Office consulted Macmillan only on major decisions. Well before the 
US administration’s 1961 review of Vietnam policy which led to increased military 
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commitment, the British offered counter-insurgency expertise, drawing on their 
experience in Malaya. This offer arose from an a combination of individualistic policy 
entrepreneurship by Robert Thompson, who would head the British Advisory Mission 
to Vietnam (BRIAM), and the Foreign Office goal of demonstrating subaltern 
usefulness in the struggle against communism in south-east Asia, while bolstering 
Britain’s status as co-chair of the 1954 Geneva peace process. This goal was especially 
important after Macmillan’s advised Kennedy in 1961 against military intervention in 
Laos, causing many in the US military and State department to suspect the British of 
tendencies to ‘appeasement’. The formation of the Malaysian federation also caused 
disquiet in Washington (Busch, 2003, 66-92), although (unlike the more 
individualistically ordered Douglas-Home administration in 1964) neither Macmillan 
nor Home sought to link Malaysia and Vietnam in their talks with the Americans. 
 The isolation dynamic in London between summer 1962 and late 1963 was marked 
by ministerial passivity in handling deepening policy tensions. Successive British 
ambassadors to Saigon were pessimistic about the capacity of the South’s ‘strategic 
hamlet’ programme to secure popular loyalty to the US military strategy and to 
overcome the insurgency. Yet Home and his FO advisers decided to keep Britain’s 
head down (CAc), neither condemning Diem’s repression in the 1963 Buddhist crisis 
nor allowing the US administration to hear officially of Britain’s doubts. When 
Macmillan asked for a briefing on the deepening crisis, the FO responded with a 
statement in which bland optimism disguised official and diplomatic doubts (PPW). 
 This passivity opened space for individualistic operation in theatre, freeing 
Thompson to establish his own relations with Diem’s regime. He also achieved 
personal influence in Washington and provided independent advice to London. As 
the theory predicts for those operating under individualistic ordering, he remained 
optimistic about the counter-insurgency longer than other British officials. As the 
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situation worsened in September and October 1963, Britain’s ambassador to 
Washington attempted to control Thompson’s communications with the US 
Government. But Macmillan was hospitalised in early October, and Home was 
preoccupied with the contest to succeed him as Prime Minister. No effective political 
direction was given on Vietnam, which severely undermined the timeliness and the 
effectiveness of Thompson’s contribution to Washington’s internal agonising (CAc, 
CP). This combination of passivity, policy incoherence, short-term reactive coping 
and absence of issue linkage show precisely the judgement style expected during 
isolation dynamics with no structural despot. 
 The Labour administration’s isolation dynamic also produced passivity over 
Vietnam. By contrast with Wilson’s hyperactive ‘peace initiatives’ of 1965 and his 
energetic efforts to find a solution in the February 1967 talks with the Soviet premier, 
Kosygin, no new initiatives were launched (CP). Ministers half-heartedly and listlessly 
persisted with irrelevant policy stances. By late 1967, occasional grandstanding aside, 
even the normally irrepressible Foreign Secretary George Brown had lost interest in 
strategic peace initiatives (FU). Yet in December 1967, Wilson again pestered Johnson 
to find out whether the formula which had failed in February was still on the table, 
although he knew well that Johnson’s San Antonio speech in September had 
superseded it (CEv). In Moscow in February 1968, Wilson went through the motions 
of urging Soviet leaders to press the North Vietnamese for a ceasefire (CP), but had 
nothing new to propose, focusing entirely on the short-term (TF). Wilson appeared 
bemused when Kosygin told him that the Americans were lying to him. His notes 
show his sense of isolation in Moscow and his declining trust both in FO and US 
advice. Untypically, he was sufficiently maladroit to share them with the White House.  
 As individualism recovered by April 1968, direction, activism and ability to 
recognise opportunities returned, when Wilson saw chances to press for new talks 
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under the aegis of the Geneva peace process co-chaired by the USSR and Britain: 
Stewart, now back at the Foreign office, worked energetically on this initiative. 
 For Heath’s administration, Vietnam was a very low priority. By now, Kissinger 
was talking directly to the North Vietnamese in Paris, leaving little scope for third-
party diplomacy, even if a British government had wanted to propose it. That left few 
options for handling Britain’s relations with the USA, not least with regard to the 
intermittent major bombing campaigns or the question of the relationship between an 
eventual peace settlement and the moribund Geneva process, of which Britain 
remained co-chair. The inflationary effects of financing the war without domestic tax 
increases were a major factor in President Nixon’s ending the Bretton Woods system 
of managed exchange rates in 1971. Nevertheless, Heath could have used British 
support for the war as a lever with Washington, but he did not (CAc, FU). Under 
Nixon, Washington no longer gave London full advance warnings of diplomatic or 
military initiatives but still expected automatic British support (CImp). Britain’s 
position as a respected subaltern in hierarchical ordering was proving impossible to 
sustain, and she was becoming the weaker party under isolate ordering. In Heath’s 
meetings with Nixon and Kissinger, the war was an ‘information only’ item but Heath 
never sought any more than this (CAc). 
 For all the tensions between the Heath and Nixon administrations and despite 
continuing domestic criticism and protest against the policy, Heath and Douglas-
Home were loyal to the USA over Vietnam, going along with massive aerial bombing, 
‘Vietnamisation’ and blaming the North Vietnamese for the war. Yet their loyalty was 
revealingly unenthusiastic, and Heath’s discourse suggested fatalism (AAc): he simply 
regarded US policy as inevitable. Answering Parliamentary questions in spring 1972, 
he described American bombing operations as an understandable reaction to North 
Vietnamese attacks: on no occasion he did offer more supportive terms (e.g., Hansard: 
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835 cc1273-4; 838 cc1251-3.). Mining the ports was likewise described as 
‘understandable’ (CAc), although the FCO’s lawyers would have accepted ‘justifiable’. 
Even Heath’s reply to Jenkins’ demand for dissociation from the Linebacker II 
bombing avoided all substantive justification and appeared fatalistically to regard the 
vast numbers of casualties as inevitable (CAc). As in 1963, Douglas-Home kept to 
himself his own doubts that US strategy could succeed (PPW). 
 Just as during Labour’s isolation dynamic, Wilson persisted rigidly with stances 
that had long ceased to be relevant (CP), Douglas-Home persisted for two years in 
making demands of the USSR that the Geneva process be reconvened, although 
bilateral talks in Paris made it superfluous. Privately, FCO advisers thought that 
repeatedly asking and being refused emphasised British impotence, and that Britain 
should try to wind down rather than crank up the Geneva machinery (PPW). Douglas-
Home knew by 1972 that the Soviets had little influence in Hanoi. He called for the 
Geneva process to be used, because it was there (FU) and Soviet refusal to use it put 
them in the wrong: efficacy and meaningful activity played second to mere presence 
in the issue. Far from being driven by the ideological anti-communism which the left 
believed to guide Douglas-Home, the FCO was keeping up appearances (PPW). The 
anomaly of the Geneva machinery was neither adjusted nor exploited, but simply 
accepted (AAc). 
Industrial relations 
Industrial relations differ from foreign relations because in Macmillan’s and Heath’s 
administrations, anomalies and adversities experienced in this field cultivated 
judgement styles which then had important feedback effects upon their social 
organisation. This finding reflects the centrality, in this period, of industrial relations 
to administrations’ fates. 
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 Both administrations pursued increasing formal regulation in industrial relations 
and incomes policy. But this demanded greater informal regulation within government 
itself, and the intended effect of bolstering hierarchy was not achieved. Because isolate 
ordering had been important in opposition from 1966 and because of the presence of 
a structurally despotic figure, this pathway led to a much deeper isolation dynamic after 
1970 than in the Macmillan administration.  
 During 1961, Macmillan’s administration began to move toward an incomes 
policy, beginning with ‘the pay pause’ – a ninety day public sector pay freeze. In 1962, 
the ‘pause’ was replaced by a percentage increase norm known as the ‘guiding light’. 
Although far short of the comprehensive regulation of pay that subsequent 
administrations would introduce, the policy required settlements to be below specified 
ceilings. However, these ceilings gave trades unions, markets and newspapers a clear 
indication of what would be a major defeat of government micro-economic policy. 
 Managing the policy eroded integration among ministers. In October 1961, 
Richard Wood, Minister of Power, failed to prohibit the Electricity Council from 
settling above the norm (CImp, but unsuccessful). Ironically, Minister of Labour John 
Hare, who had suggested concessions, sought to cover his own position by rounding 
on Wood who was left exposed by an official statement that the agreement violated 
the policy (PPW). Macmillan asked another minister to ‘keep an eye’ on Wood in 
subsequent negotiations with the gas industry. When the pay pause broke down, the 
administration felt unable to pursue a structurally despotic strategy of passing on 
constraints by imposition (CRt, FU). In the 1962 rail industry negotiations, the rail 
director, Dr Beeching, threatened to resign if he were forbidden to make the unions a 
generous pay offer, effectively holding the administration to ransom. Macmillan now 
operated with guile, meeting Beeching in secret (PPW). In what were effectively direct 
negotiations, Macmillan hinted to the rail unions that settling in the spring within 3% 
  22 
would enable a more generous increase in the autumn. That is, in coping with a short-
term problem (TF), Macmillan unilaterally undermined his own policy (AAc), and the 
concessions that had to be made in 1963 only added to wage inflation. Macmillan 
blamed (RS) his Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, for what he himself encouraged – namely, 
sending inconsistent signals and the incoherent relationship between industrial 
relations and incomes policy. Industrial relations therefore undermined Macmillan’s 
relations with Lloyd, leading to his sacking in the July 1962 reshuffle, deepening the 
administration’s isolation dynamic.  
 By 1963, policy was as weakly integrated as the administration itself was. Pay 
settlements commonly violated policy norms (AAc), as the new Chancellor’s fiscal 
expansion encouraged union demands. While grandiose schemes were being 
developed for detailed governance of prices, incomes and even dividends in pursuit of 
a grand but chimerical bargain with the trades unions at the NEDC, the cabinet could 
not even agree modest plans for a redundancy pay scheme (O’Hara, 2004, 32-7). 
 Wilson’s second administration was lucky in few respects, save that during its 
isolation dynamic no major industrial relations issues arose. Its strategy from 1966 was 
oriented to the short term. In the previous year, a battle over statutory incomes policy 
had been fought to a pyrrhic victory, causing the leading trade unionist Frank Cousins 
to resign from the administration. Having weathered a difficult dock strike in August, 
ministers agreed in December 1967 to concede the dockworkers’ renewed demands 
to avoid another strike in January which would coincide with a severely deflationary 
budget (AAc). By March 1968, there were plans for renewing the statutory incomes 
legislation. Ministers were deeply divided, with several believing fatalistically that it 
could not work (AAc). Critical decisions were procrastinated until after the mid-March 
reshuffle (TF), when individualism began to revive in the administration’s social 
organisation.  
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 The Heath administration’s industrial relations legislation had been prepared in 
extraordinary detail in opposition (Moran, 1977) and was designed to introduce heavy 
statutory restraints on trades unions’ powers to take industrial action. Employment 
and then Home Secretary Robert Carr, Solicitor-General Sir Geoffrey Howe and 
Heath all assumed wrongly that this legislation would be accepted by the unions 
(CImp), because of the administration’s electoral mandate. The unions’ refusal to 
comply left legislation clearly useless yet politically unrepealable even as it undermined 
the scope for talks (AAc). The administration felt it had few other options (FU). In 
1972, the Act was used to impose a ‘cooling off’ period and a strike ballot in a national 
rail dispute, but the strike went ahead. Private employers’ efforts to secure 
imprisonment of strikers in a crippling dispute over containerisation affecting the 
docks provoked much bitterness, nearly leading to a general strike in July. These 
provisions were never used again (FU, AAc). Meanwhile, the ‘N minus one’ 
nationalised sector pay rule (each year’s award was to be 1% below the previous year’s) 
had been dramatically broken in February 1972, when a national strike by mineworkers 
forced the administration to make humiliating concessions (AImp, unsuccessful). 
 Thus, in incomes policy and industrial relations, the administration failed in its 
attempt to pass on economic constraints through imposition, and was forced to accept 
anomalies and losses (CRt). When this structurally despotic approach to imposing 
policy collapsed, there was no fallback, as there might have been under an 
individualistic or hierarchical judgement style (FU). Heath’s political secretary, 
Douglas Hurd (1979, 103), graphically described the growing despair (TF, PPW) and 
loss of cohesion amongst ministers, whilst a review by officials of the miners’ strike 
complained that the policy ‘can only break, not bend’, a phrase Heath underlined in 
his own copy (FU). Yet so deep in isolate ordering was the administration that 
ministers learned only to pursue further social regulation with even greater 
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determination (AImp). Reflecting his own structural location, Heath ‘learned’ that he 
could not trust his ministers and that he must control policymaking more tightly from 
No 10. In consequence, policymaking became steadily more focused on short-term 
coping (TF). Tripartite talks with the TUC and CBI in the autumn of 1972, the 
administration’s notorious ‘U-turns’ in industrial policy and the imposition of a 
statutory prices and incomes policy were all driven by Heath and his advisors, and 
imposed on the cabinet (AImp). When a second miners’ dispute began in late 1973, 
Heath was determined to maintain his baroque incomes policy. Again, events showed 
that it could not bend, only break, and the search for ever stronger formal regulation 
of incomes undermined itself. Because everyone knew the limits, the Coal Board 
judged that it could not credibly offer the miners less than what everyone knew was 
available, and to ministers’ horror, its opening offer was set at the maximum-permitted 
level. Reacting to ‘mistakes’ they believed they had made in handling the 1972 coal 
strike, Ministers announced a state of emergency early, a further piece of strong 
regulation (AImp). This too backfired: no one else could see why it was yet necessary. 
As the dispute progressed, Heath brought decisionmaking into No 10, again allowing 
industrial relations to spill-over onto the administration’s informal ordering. He 
replaced his employment secretary, but did not allow his successor, Whitelaw, access 
to the key meetings nor gave him clear strategic guidance (CImp). Short-term tactics 
increasingly dominated decisionmaking (RS), yet ministers rejected all attempts to 
allow policy to bend, by finding a face-saving formula (PPW). In January, ministers 
rejected a TUC proposal, although they could have settled on it and blamed the TUC 
for its subsequent breakdown (AImp). The administration then conceded a pay 
relativities inquiry, thus undermining their argument that an election was the only way 
to bring the miners to heel (CRt). Thus, another major setback was accepted (AAc), 
because the structurally despotic monster barring strategy had again proved brittle. 
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Declining ministerial cohesion created new anomalies as conflict about how best to 
deal with the strike spilled onto tactical disagreements about the election date. 
Discussion 
Before and (in the Wilson administration’s case) after isolation dynamics, analysis of 
judgement in decisions exhibits almost none of these codes (6, forthcoming). In these 
periods, they characterise decisions on the most significant policies, save in reserved 
individualistic zones (Macmillan, superpower relations) and policy field niches 
(BRIAM, Whitelaw in Belfast) where social organisation also differed; conversely, in 
peripheral zones (Short, Crosland, 1969-70) isolate ordering persisted after it had 
waned in the heart of Wilson’s administration, cultivating weakly cohesive judgement 
style. 
 Table Two summarises the administration’s trajectories, the degree of isolate 
ordering in social organisation, and dimensions of thought style the theory expects 
from decisions in isolate ordering. Lacking space for codes for every decision 
discussed, instead each cell contains examples from the text which support the codes 
for particular decisions. The pattern emerging consistently from the accumulation of 
codes supports the expectations that in the period of the weakening social integration 
and deepening social regulation within the administration, cognitive integration 
weakened. Thus, public and private positions diverged; anomalies were accepted 
except in the cases of despotic ordering where they were suppressed and imposition 
strategies were pursued; past and future were less integrated and planning horizons 
foreshortened; and setbacks could not be recovered through fallback options. 
[Table Two] 
 A commonly used device in the neo-Durkheimian tradition for representing 
change within and among elementary forms has been a transformation of the 
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conventional matrix representation of the derivation of the forms into a continuously 
differentiable space in which curves represent the shifts within that space of particular 
units examined (cf. Rayner, 1982, 270; 1986, 62). In a qualitative and illustratively 
ordinal rather than a cardinal manner, that continuous differentiability represents 
differences of degree in social regulation and integration. Thus Figure One shows 
contrasting trajectories of isolation dynamics in the three administrations. It differs 
from previous such analyses in two ways. Unlike in Rayner’s (1982) study, no claim is 
made that, if the administrations had lasted longer, the process would have cycled back 
to its starting point. Secondly, unlike Rayner’s (1986) study, the Figure below compares 
three administrations. Moreover, the text makes clear that the dynamics rest on 
interactions of positive and negative feedback dynamics, thus using the theory’s 
cybernetic machinery Thompson developed after Rayner’s 1980s work appeared. 
[Figure One] 
 The isolation dynamic in the Heath administration began earlier, ran deeper and 
lasted longer, mainly because of the strong, structurally despotic element in its brittle 
judgement style of passing constraints on by imposition. Its pathway into isolate 
ordering partly resembled Macmillan’s administration’s route, resulting from a 
conscious attempt to build hierarchy. Yet Macmillan himself reacted against stronger 
regulation by undermining the social integration he had first sought. Wilson’s 
administration’s isolation dynamic was brief, shallow and driven by setbacks in policies 
generated in an ordering that was predominantly individualistic. 
 These cases nail some myths and misunderstandings about isolate social ordering. 
First, they show that the structural serf position is not straightforwardly passive, as 
often assumed. It can promote guileful coping and adaptation to accommodate 
anomalies and disguise loss absorption. The incoherent but guileful coping in 
Macmillan’s administration’s final eighteen months may have avoided a fate like 
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Heath’s, by allowing him to avoid greater rigidity in incomes policy than British politics 
could have borne. 
 Revealingly, none of these isolation dynamics was marked by internal conflict: 
even the apparently serious threats from his crown princes to Wilson’s premiership 
arose in individualistic periods of his administration’s life. 
 Conversely, we can see that, when faced with determined and strongly enclaved 
opponents, as many unions had become when Heath’s administration came to power, 
structurally despotic positions are especially brittle and vulnerable. Nevertheless, 
Heath’s structurally despotic position enabled him to force though the EEC 
application. His accurate estimation of his chances of doing so may have been the 
obverse of his erroneous judgement of his chances of holding his incomes policy 
intact. This point exemplifies the argument that each elementary form cultivates 
thought styles which sustain positive capabilities accurately to recognise opportunities 
and risks, as well as the obverse incapacities and error. 
 Third, the case of Wilson’s administration shows that exit is possible, at least from 
a shallow isolation dynamic. But this may not be typical. The other two administrations 
achieved no such exit before the prime minister fell, by resignation in 1963 and by 
electoral defeat in 1974. 
 The argument shows that that changing informal institutions rather than ideas 
explain the shifts. For ideological change (e.g., after Heath’s ‘U-turns’) often followed 
developments in thought style. Institutionally-driven thought styles thus provide more 
direct explanations of changing policies than do ideological beliefs. 
Conclusion 
The case-comparative design shows that isolation dynamics shape the fates of British 
administrations. Moreover, they arise differently and follow different trajectories to 
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their destination. Because these dynamics can be observed in administrations in other 
constitutional systems, the argument merits future cross-national research. 
 The study shows that trajectories of change in institutional form are reflected in 
styles of political judgement exhibited across many fields of policymaking. This 
argument shows that understanding isolation dynamics helps us to understand how 
administrations’ political capabilities change over their time in office. 
 The comparative analysis supports the neo-Durkheimian explanations of both 
divergence in pathway and of consistency between social organisation and judgement 
style. The weighted mix of forms of administrations’ informal social organisation 
explains changing trajectories in judgement styles across social, industrial relations and 
foreign policy in very different administrations. 
 Methodologically, a theory originally developed for empirical examination using 
ethnographic methods has been shown suitable for research by comparative case 
designs, analysing judgement styles using diaries and secondary historical evidence to 
analyse informal social organisation and archival sources to examine judgement style. 
 The study shows, too, that informal institutions within administrations can change 
with a speed that might surprise those who imagine institutional change to be a glacial 
affair, or who suppose that institutional approaches explain stability better than 
change. 
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Annex: sources, data and coding 
Available time truncates interviews; policymakers may have fault memories or 
represent their past strategically. Although National Archives sources have their 
limitations, they are naturalistic, extensive and capture behaviour, so are preferred for 
researching judgement styles. Some 60,000 photographed official pages in over 500 
National Archives files were analysed. Case coding focused on recognition and 
management of anomaly, recognition of constraint, whether fallback options were 
compassed, risks willingly and knowingly run, whether issues are strongly or weakly 
linked, use of any historical analogies indicating length and integration of memory, 
length of planning horizon, etc. There is no systematic bias toward hierarchy in the 
archival data, because other forms can readily be discerned when coding focuses on 
the aspects of style of judgement identified in the article. 
 To code for changing informal social organisation, extensive use was made of 
ministers’ and senior civil servants’ personal papers (especially in the Churchill College 
Archives Centre, the Bodleian and the LSE libraries). Every major published 
ministerial and official diary, memoir and biography from these administrations was 
read and annotated to inform coding. Over 500 secondary books and another 500 
articles were used. Coding focused on informal relations among ministers and their 
advisers on the dimensions of social integration and regulation, and on features of 
elementary forms as (this has equivalent effect, but evidence for forms is sometimes 
easier to discern in documents than for dimensions), e.g., rule-based authority; patron-
client relations; sectarian collective density and external distancing; of weak or absent 
bonds and withdrawal under vertical relations. Archival sources also provided 
information changing formal institutions. Diaries and memoirs can mislead; 
biographies can be hagiographic; they must therefore be used cautiously only in 
triangulation and with corroboration, and focusing only on evidence of informal social 
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relations and organisation, to minimise risks of wrongly inferring individualistic 
ordering. 
 Coding was of cases, not of separate documents. Codes from the entire set of 
sources were identified chronologically, aggregated and compared, and inconsistencies 
resolved. High level codes for elementary forms for each policy field in each 
administration were assembled by aggregating codes and identifying relative weighting 
to reveal social dynamics between phases of administrations’ lives.  
 Organisational forms and of styles of political judgement are not stated baldly on 
the face of documents, but revealed, for example, in how documents are drafted, 
policies argued about and behaviours, reported and in justifications presented for 
decisions. So coding could not be a mechanical exercise, but had to be done 
inferentially. Each source had to be read in full appreciation of its context, alternative 
codes considered and full subsets of sources re-examined holistically, before evidence 
of the expected associations between social organisation and thought style could 
confidently be accepted. 6 (forthcoming) presents a fuller discussion of the 
methodology, together with inferential arguments for and against specific codes. 
 For these reasons, coding had to be done manually. Detailed notes were taken on 
each file, document, memoir and biography. Initially hypothesised codes of features 
of social organisation and of judgement style were entered in annotation sheets. Codes 
were assembled on cases, inconsistencies identified and revisited (in fact, the few 
found could be resolved by closer iterative analysis of evidence). 
 Because there is insufficient space for citation of all primary and secondary sources 
used and this article’s purpose is case-comparative rather than historical, only selected 
citations are provided; full references are available on request. 
 Methodologically, the research uses congruence analysis on codes of social 
organisation and of judgement style. Because the analysis of industrial relations and 
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trades union law reform cases shows the second phase of the feedback loop from 
judgement style in decisions back upon social organisation of the administrations, this 
part of the study engages in a partial causal process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
 
Notes
1 For this reason, the common label, ‘cultural theory’ is misleading. This is an institutional theory 
explaining aspects of cognition, not an ideational theory (6 and Mars, 2008; Grendstad and Selle, 1995). 
2 Hence the theory is ‘neo-Durkheimian’, unlike other institutionalist frameworks. 
3 This should not be confused with the conventional trichotomy of ‘markets, hierarchies and networks’, 
with an additional element. 6 (2015b) argues the trichotomy is ill-formed, comprises elements from 
different levels of analysis, and is not exhaustive and that the neo-Durkheimian approach is superior. 
4 Describing this form as ‘egalitarian’ is not felicitous. Defined by strong social integration within a 
heavily marked boundary, it emphasises inequality between members and non-members of a sectarian 
kind. Moreover, egalitarianism is an ideology; a term describing an institutional ordering is required. 
5 Analysis of comprehensive secondary schooling showed the same patterns, but is not reported here 
for reasons of space: further details are available on request. 
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Table 1: Codes for isolate judgement style 
 
Form 
Style of managing 
Hierarchical Individualistic Enclaved Isolate 
constraints; whether 
constraints on strategy 
are 
 
accepted as legitimate, 
represented and adjusted 
as rules; 
sought to be negotiated; resisted; CAc: accepted with resignation and coped 
with, e.g., in policy drift, passivity, going 
through motions; CEv: or evaded 
opportunistically (structural serf), CImp: 
passed on by imposition (structurally 
despotic); CRt: when imposition fails, due to 
brittleness, and negative feedback from other 
forms, retreat to the structural serf position; 
fallbacks: whether 
fallback strategies 
(short of accepting 
losses) are 
accepted but controlled 
under rules; 
encompassed readily; rejected as unprincipled FU: expected to be unavailable 
anomalies: whether 
events or institutions 
found to be anomalous 
within categories used 
are dealt with by 
adjusting rules to render 
classification consistent 
as opportunities to be exploited horrors to be debarred AAc: facts to be accepted (serf) or AImp: 
suppressed by imposition (despotic) 
willingness to bear risks: 
whether risks accepted 
are those offer greatest 
chances of 
systematic control keeping options open for 
negotiation or for individual 
leadership assertion 
protecting integrity RS: survival or coping 
past and future long planning horizon 
and collective memory, 
optimism about future 
under constraints 
short collective memory but short 
or medium-term planning horizon, 
strong optimism for medium-term 
future 
foreshortened planning horizon 
to reinforce urgency of drastic 
action, long collective memory 
in Manichaean mode, extreme 
alternation between optimism 
and pessimism 
TF: foreshortened planning horizon, short 
collective memory, pessimism or fatalism 
about future (serf), and/or effort to maintain 
remaining fragile prestige (despotic) 
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integration of public and 
private positions 
controlled and limited by 
publicity and privacy 
norms 
weakly integrated to encompass 
exploitation, limited by recognition 
of costs to reputations in future 
transactions from being discovered 
asserted on principled grounds PPW: weakly integrated because regarded as 
unrealistic and guilefully circumvented with 
hypocrisy or desperately avoided 
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Conservative: PM Macmillan 
Isolation dynamic: c. autumn 
1961-October 1963 
1964-1970 





Conservative: PM: Heath 
Isolation dynamic: throughout, 
but especially autumn 1971 / 
February 1972-February 1974 
Trajectory    
Onset Mid-1962 to autumn 1963 
During a second period of 
office, after an election 
had raised expectations 
and increased the 
governing party majority 
 
November 1967 to 
late spring 1968 
During a second 
period of office, after 





Already marked in 
opposition 
Exacerbated from 1971 and 
1972, deep by late 1973 
Occasion Policy adversity and 
setbacks 
Policy adversity and 
setbacks 
Commencement in 
opposition: no particular 
occasion 
Exacerbation in 
government: policy adversity 
and setbacks 
 
Scope Domestic affairs Domestic and foreign 
affairs 
Domestic and foreign affairs 
Exit None, while in office Reassertion of 
individualism; 
fairly rapid, in 




ambitious attacks by 
opponents, 
resignation by 
difficult key minister 






   
Weak linkages Macmillan treatment of 
Wood 




All links between PM and 
ministers, PM and 
backbenchers; even links 
among discontented 
ministers very weak 
Structural despotic 
position 
Spasmodic, mild initial 
attempt by Macmillan, 
which initiated dynamic; 
but never achieved, and 
entirely lost after July 1962 
reshuffle 
Very mild indeed; 
only ‘arms to South 
Africa’ shows any 
symptoms 
Strong, and increasingly so 
after February 1972 
humiliation by NUM, when 
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Imposition (AImp) July 1962 reshuffle 
replacing Selwyn Lloyd 
with Maudling effectively 
imposed expansion on 
reluctant Treasury 
[mild, internal] 
Wilson’s insistence in 
decision over arms to 
South Africa 
Imposition on party 
of sacrifice of free 
prescriptions in 
January 1968 budget 
[strong, external] 
‘N minus one’ and Stage III 
incomes policies and miners’ 





n/a Postponement of 
decision on 
attempting to renew 
incomes policy 
legislation 
‘N minus 1’ and Stage III 
incomes policies and miners’ 
disputes and strikes 1972, 
1973-4. 
Coping (CEv, RS) Buying industrial peace 




norm settlement with 
dockworkers 
Emergency nationalisation 
of Rolls Royce 1971 and 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
1972 
Passivity, drift (CAc) Policy toward Diem 
regime in Vietnam 1963 
 Vietnam policy 
Anomaly suppression 
(AImp) 




Both ‘pause’ and ‘guiding’ 
known to generate 
anomalies in relativities; 
no attempt to address 
Short’s ‘compulsion’ 




zone of persistent 
isolate ordering after 
end of main isolate 
dynamic) 
Inability either to use, 
enforce or amend Industrial 
Relations Act after defeats 
spring-summer 1972 
Risk acceptance for 
short term coping 
July 1962 reshuffle, after 
Butler had leaked 
Short’s ‘compulsion’ 
bill (peripheral zone 
of persistent isolate 
ordering after end of 
main isolate dynamic) 
Acceptance of political risks 




Buying industrial peace Acceptance of above-
norm settlement with 
dockworkers 
Thatcher accommodation to 
comprehensive schooling 




Pursuit of grand 
settlement with trades 
unions 1962-3 
Continued pursuit of 
Phase A/B with 
Johnson; continued 
importuning of 
Kosygin on Vietnam 
February 1968 
Call for reconvening of 
Geneva conference 1970-2 
Disparity between 
public and private 
positions (PPW) 
Comprehensive schooling 
and grammar schools 
To the Americans, avowed 
support over Vietnam; 
privately, deepening 
conviction in London that 
the US policy would fail 
Official commitment 
to renewing statutory 
incomes policy, in 
private Wilson and 
Jenkins doubted it 
could be done or was 
worth trying now 
Officially refusing to 
countenance any 
amendment to Industrial 
Relations Act; in private, a 
series of increasingly 
desperate exercises to try to 
find ways to do without total 
loss of government authority 
Guile (PPW) Macmillan’s handling of 
rail negotiations 1961-2 
n/a Thatcher’s clandestine 
support for some grammar 
schools 
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Figure 1. Key pathways into and, in one case, out of isolation dynamics: comparing three 
































1967-8, no sustained 
structural despotic 
position 
Labels for administrations are placed in the cell in which the corresponding arrow begins. 
Arrows represent direction of change over time. Depth (severity) or, conversely, 
shallowness of each isolation dynamic is represented by the distance of the line from the 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. The initiation of the line showing the Heath 
government’s trajectory in isolate ordering reflects the condition of Heath’s shadow 
cabinet in the years before the 1970s election victory. 
